Syria, Lebanon, and
France: Love and Revenge
Abdullah Iskandar, Al HayatBilateral or tripartite relations between France, Syria, and Lebanon have been
moving back and forth between two extremes ever since the two Arab countries gained their
independence. They are relations that are good, even exceptional, at times, and tense at
others. They fluctuate unjustifiably between extreme love and extreme revenge, given the
relations that are supposed to exist between countries with a common history and common
interests. Such relations are supposed to be cumulative in terms of cooperation and
exchange of interests, instead of regressing to zero. On the other hand, these relations
witness an excess of enthusiasm that does not seem to have benefited from this regression.
These relations are also characterized by the fact that the Lebanese issue always remains
in the background, even when it is about French-Syrian matters, such as cooperation in
administrative reform or cultural cooperation. This means that bilateral relations in this
triangle still involve a whirlwind of emotions and irrationality linked to the
establishment of the Syrian and Lebanese States, under French sponsorship, a little less
than a century ago. These relations have not yet been able to overcome the impact of such
establishment and turn into normal relations among independent countries which history is
supposed to be an incentive for widening the scope of cooperation and reconciliation.
Nowadays, a new phase is on its way, for as Syrian foreign minister Walid Moallem put it,
he is in Paris in order to prepare for president Assad's "historic visit" and
meeting with his French counterpart Nicolas Sarkozy in margin of the Mediterranean Summit
after a week. This phase moves the Syrian-French relation from contention to
understanding, and restores cooperation. Nowadays, we also witness the formation of the
first government during Lebanese president Michel Sleiman's mandate, which eases French
openness to Syria and puts an end to Syrian reservations regarding authority in Lebanon.
In other words, circumstances are propitious for the Syrian-Lebanese relation to move from
the phase of disputes and accusations to the phase of normalization. It is obvious that a
prerequisite for this would be to overcome the impact of the establishment of the Syrian
and Lebanese States, i.e. to establish diplomatic relations based on the full independence
of both. It is also obvious that Damascus is ready to bring about such a relation,
according to many Syrian declarations - the last of which was that this will take place
after the formation of the Lebanese government.
In parallel, it appears from Syrian diplomacy that there is an adjustment of Syrian
objectives. Regardless of the motives behind it and the extent which such a step may
reach, Damascus has taken unexpected measures in the last months, from attending the
Annapolis Conference to facilitating a solution in Lebanon to indirect negotiations with
Israel.
It is thus that in a short period of time, all the essential constituents are present for
applying what should have been done more than half a century ago, i.e. diplomatic
exchanges between Beirut and Damascus, with normalized relations between two neighboring
independent countries linked by givens and interests that exceed mere borders. With this
step, Syrian-French relations are normalized, with a solid foundation - getting rid of the
Lebanese obsession and recognizing the independence of Lebanon. Assad and Sarkozy's agenda
will surely include many important items, including Lebanon, and it is probable that Paris
will witness the first Lebanese-Syrian summit during Sleiman's mandate. What better time
than these meetings to announce the agreement on starting the practical measures for
diplomatic representation between Beirut and Damascus and on introducing the troubled
relations among the countries of this triangle to the context of normalization. |